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On the Utility of Anonymized Flow Traces for Anomaly Detection
The sharing of network traces is an important prerequisite for the development and evaluation
of efficient anomaly detection mechanisms. Unfortunately, privacy concerns and data protec-
tion laws prevent network operators from sharing these data. Anonymization is a promising
solution in this context; however, it is unclear if the sanitization of data preserves the traffic
characteristics or introduces artifacts that may falsify traffic analysis results. In this paper, we
examine the utility of anonymized flow traces for anomaly detection. We quantitatively evaluate
the impact of IP address anonymization, namely variations of permutation and truncation, on
the detectability of large-scale anomalies. Specifically, we analyze three weeks of un-sampled
and non-anonymized network traces from a medium-sized backbone network. We find that all
anonymization techniques, except prefix-preserving permutation, degrade the utility of data for
anomaly detection. We show that the degree of degradation depends to a large extent on the na-
ture and mix of anomalies present in a trace. Moreover, we present a case study that illustrates
how traffic characteristics of individual hosts are distorted by anonymization.
1. Introduction
One of the principal reasons for the slow progress in anomaly detection research is the lack
of publicly available, unaltered network traffic traces. The sharing of traffic data is hindered since
releasing data always introduces a threat to users’ privacy. Even when data export is restricted to
packet headers, as is the case with Cisco NetFlow, a certain amount of personal information may
still be extracted and exploited to illegitimately profile user behavior. This threat has already been
recognized by data protection legislation in both Europe [6, 7] and the United States [15]. As a result,
multiple anonymization tools that prevent the leakage of privacy information have been developed,
such as FLAIM [18], TCPdpriv [13], and CryptoPAn [8].
For practical reasons these tools have been evaluated only with regard to privacy concerns (e.g.,
in [4, 10, 3, 17]). The remaining question is whether the data sanitization preserves the traffic char-
acteristics, or introduces artifacts that compromise the utility for research purposes. For researchers
and engineers with access to unanonymized data sets, this is not an issue; unfortunately, only few
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research institutes have such traffic traces available and the large majority works with publicly avail-
able, but already anonymized data sets. As a result, a study on the impact of anonymization methods
is essential and indeed overdue, since numerous anomaly detection algorithms have been evaluated
with anonymized data. Therefore, the goal of this work is to determine to what extent the anonymized
traces falsify the results of commonly used anomaly detection mechanisms.
To the best of our knowledge, the specific problem we are investigating has not yet been ad-
dressed in literature. In [19], Soule et al. study NetFlow data from two backbone networks that apply
different sampling and anonymization schemes, and suggest that anonymization might have an impact
on anomaly detection. The problem of data loss due to anonymization is also identified in [25], where
the authors give qualitative recommendations for anonymization of NetFlow logs when security ser-
vices are outsourced. Yurcik et al. [24] analyze single-field anonymization tradeoffs with regard to
intrusion detection. Unfortunately, their dataset contains already anonymized IP addresses, hence the
impact of IP address anonymization techniques on utility is not studied. On the contrary, [2] and [12]
studied the utility of sampled traffic traces without addressing the effect of anonymization.
This paper represents the first comprehensive study on the utility of anonymized data for statisti-
cal anomaly detection approaches. Specifically, we focus on the anonymization of IP addresses as they
comprise the biggest threat to user privacy. We analyze the most popular IP address anonymization
techniques, namely blackmarking, truncation, random permutation, and (partial) prefix-preserving
permutation. Our contributions are as follows: (i) we introduce a generic methodology for evaluating
the impact of anonymization on flow-based traffic analysis applications; (ii) we quantify the utility of
anonymized data for backbone anomaly detection with the help of a three-week long data set from a
medium-size ISP and an anomaly detector based on a Kalman filter; and (iii) we present an overall
estimate for the impact of anonymization on the analysis of individual hosts’ traffic characteristics.
To tackle the problem of determining the utility of anonymized data, we first introduce the
granularity design space for traffic analysis. This design space has two dimensions: the subset size
of the address space under investigation and the resolution of the examination. We argue that the
complete granularity design space is valuable for traffic analysis, even though today, only a subset
of it is used (e.g., Origin-Destination flows). We then show how the granularity design space is
diminished by the considered anonymization techniques.
In section 3 and 4, we present a measurement study on the impact of anonymization on the data
utility for anomaly detection. We introduce the Kalman filter used for anomaly detection and evaluate
the detectors’ performance on the unanonymized and unsampled, manually labeled three-week data
set. We assess the utility of anonymized data by evaluating the detector performance on the restricted
set of metrics available with each anonymization scheme. Specifically, we evaluate the results with
the help of ROC curves [9] that plot false positives vs. true positives for a range of thresholds. We
show that the restriction of available granularities through anonymization degrades the performance of
anomaly detection. Surprisingly, we find that the degree of degradation differs for volume, scan/DoS,
and network fluctuation anomalies, as well as for UDP and TCP traffic. As an example, we will show
that for the detection of network fluctuations, the utility drops from 87% to 70% when the number of
truncated bits is doubled.
In section 5, we study the effect of anonymization on detailed traffic analysis and root cause
identification. We are able to show that even a small restriction of the subset size heavily impacts the
visibility of anomalies. Finally we discuss our findings and conclude the paper in section 6.
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Figure 1: Granularity design space for metrics used in
statistical anomaly detection.
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Figure 2: Resolutions and subset sizes available with dif-
ferent anonymization techniques.
2. Utility of Anonymized Data for Anomaly Detection
In this section, we investigate how five popular IP address anonymization techniques impact
statistical anomaly detection on flow data. To make our discussion more systematic, we introduce
a granularity design space for traffic analysis, and show how the different anonymization techniques
diminish this design space.
2.1. A Granularity Design Space
Up to now the metrics used for anomaly detection, and traffic analysis in general, have been
designed in an ad-hoc manner, based on (i) the characteristics of the data set under study, and (ii)
the type of traffic characteristic one is interested in. Prominent examples of such metrics are the
well-known volume metrics, such as byte, packet, and flow counts, which are simply computed over
all traffic in a given trace. Lakhina et al. in [11] group the anonymized traffic from the Abilene
network into Origin-Destination (OD) flows before analyzing it further with Principal Component
Analysis. Whereas, in [22, 23] host-based metrics such as IP address entropy or the number of active
connections are used for host profiling in a clustering algorithm.
To investigate the impact of anonymization in a systematic manner, however, it is necessary
to explore the whole granularity design space for traffic analysis. To motivate the design space it is
helpful to use an allegory from image processing or photography. When taking a picture, one focuses
on the object of interest and selects a fine or coarse resolution to display the details at the desired
level. Similarly, the granularity design space has two dimensions:
Subset size The size of the network that is to be analyzed. When analyzing backbone data for exam-
ple, we can analyze all traffic, or we can focus on a specific subnet in the backbone.
Resolution The address granularity at which the traffic is analyzed. We can select a very high reso-
lution of IP addresses if one is interested in profiling hosts, or a low resolution of Autonomous
Systems (or OD flows) if one is interested in more global events.
We give a matrix representation of the granularity design space in Fig. 1. The x-axis ranges
from the largest subset size of all traffic (00 bits), to the smallest possible subset size of a single IP
address (32 bits). Likewise the y-axis ranges from the highest resolution of individual IP addresses
(32 bits) to the lowest resolution of all traffic (00 bits). The design space matrix can be divided in
three sections: the upper triangle, the diagonal, and the lower triangle. Traditional volume metrics
fall in one of the cells on the diagonal, where the subset size equals the resolution (e.g., we select all
traffic from a /16 subnet and compute the flow counts over all traffic coming from that /16 network).
The upper triangle features metrics where the resolution level is smaller than the size of the selected
traffic subset. Such metrics, e.g, the number of unique IP addresses in the inbound traffic to a selected
/24 subnet, are also frequently used for traffic analysis. Finally, for metrics on the lower triangle, the
resolution level is larger than the size of the selected traffic subset. Such metrics are rarely used today,
and are thus of less interest to our study.
Note, the full design space is not always available. For example, when working with data from
stub networks, e.g., a campus network, where the maximum available subset size equals the IP address
range assigned to the studied network. For a /16 campus network the subset size may range from 16
to 32, i.e., subset sizes larger than 16 bit are not available. Nevertheless, to keep the subsequent
discussion general we assume the whole design space is available.
To further illustrate the granularity design space, we give example metrics for five selected cells
of the matrix:
• Cell 1 [00,00]: Select all traffic and set the resolution to the minimum. An example metric is
the well-known volume over all traffic.
• Cell 2 [00,32]: Select all traffic and set the resolution to the maximum. Examples are the
volume per IP address or the number of unique IP addresses in all traffic.
• Cell 3 [32,32]: Select traffic to/from one IP address and set the resolution to the maximum.
Metrics falling in this category are, e.g., the number of unique ports per IP address, or the
number of unique IP addresses that the host under observation sends traffic to.
• Cell 4 [24,32]: Select traffic to/from one /24 network and set the resolution to the maximum.
Examples for this case are the flow count per IP address, or the unique number of IP addresses
that send traffic in the monitored /24 network.
• Cell 5 [00,16]: Select all traffic and set the resolution to /16 networks. An example metric is
the volume per /16 networks in all traffic.
2.2. How Anonymization Diminishes the Design Space
In the following we outline the studied IP address anonymization techniques and show how
they diminish the granularity design space. The most commonly employed IP address anonymization
techniques are blackmarking, truncation, random permutation, prefix-preserving permutation, and
partial prefix-preserving permutation. An illustrative example for each technique, except blackmark-
ing which is trivial, is given in Table 1.
The available subset of the design space for different anonymization techniques is illustrated
in Fig. 2, where filled squares mark the possible combinations of subset size and resolution for each
anonymization technique. Note that for permutation-based approaches all fields with a subset size
smaller than 00 are marked with a different color. We did this to signify that subsets of smaller sizes
IP Address Truncation Random Prefix-Pres. Partial Prefix-Pres.
(16 bits) Permutation Permutation Permutation (16 bits)
129.132.91.35 129.132.0.0 112.4.23.73 22.5.99.76 73.9.8.1
129.132.91.177 129.132.0.0 62.12.96.67 22.5.99.41 73.9.181.17
129.132.8.37 129.132.0.0 205.72.5.18 22.5.181.92 73.9.1.230
152.88.3.90 152.88.0.0 2.14.12.133 110.27.20.1 18.7.18.133
152.96.99.2 152.96.0.0 19.0.111.20 110.9.0.12 24.125.43.6
82.130.102.115 82.130.0.0 12.171.92.3 145.21.5.19 145.213.2.77
Table 1: Examples of IP address anonymization
may be distinguished, but not identified, since the mapping from real to anonymized IP addresses
is usually not known. Hence, a subset of interest has to be identified by different means, e.g., by
selecting subnets with particular traffic characteristics. For the subsequent analysis, however, we
make no distinction between the two cases.
Blackmarking (BM) is the simplest of all studied anonymization techniques. It blindly replaces
all IP addresses in a trace with the same value. As a result, all information about individual IP
addresses or subnets is lost and only metrics with the lowest resolution and the largest subset size,
e.g., the volume over all traffic, can be computed. This corresponds to a single cell in the design space
matrix, the lower left corner of the matrix. Several traces from the Internet traffic archive (LBNL) are
anonymized with blackmarking. Please refer to the UCRchive for a comprehensive list of available
traces §.
Truncation (TR{t}) replaces the t least significant bits of an IP address with 0. Thus, truncating
8 bits would replace an IP address with its corresponding class C network address. With respect
to the design space, this means only metrics with a resolution and subset size of [00, 32 - t] can
be computed when truncation is used. The number of available granularities decreases with t, the
number of truncated bits, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The traces from the Abilene network, which have
been used to evaluate numerous anomaly detection approaches, are anonymized with truncation of 11
bits.
Random permutation (RP) translates IP addresses using a random permutation that does not
preserve the prefix structure. Since permutation creates a one-to-one mapping, the number of distinct
IP addresses is the same. Hence, when random permutation is used for anonymizing a trace, metrics
that can be computed on it may only feature the highest and lowest resolution values, as well as
largest and smallest subset sizes (see Fig. 2). Note that these correspond to the four corners of the
design space matrix. A special case of random permutation is the renumbering of IP addresses (e.g.,
TCPdpriv with level 0). Packet Traces from UCLA CSD, as well as several traces from the Internet
traffic archive (LBNL) are sanitized using random permutation.
Partial prefix-preserving permutation (PPP{p}), as proposed in [16], permutes the host and
network part of IP addresses independently. It preserves the prefix structure in a trace at one specific
prefix length p, and at the level of IP addresses. Consequently, this technique retains all granularities
that have a resolution and subset size of either 00, p, or 32 (see Fig. 2). PPP is a popular technique that
is used for anonymizing traces from the Passive Measurement and Analysis project (PMA) and the
Internet traffic archive (LBNL). PMA uses PPP{12} and PPP{16}. Moreover, level 1 of TCPdpriv
corresponds to PPP{16}.
§http://networks.cs.ucr.edu/ucrchive/measurement.htm
Prefix-preserving permutation (PP) permutes IP addresses so that two addresses sharing a com-
mon real prefix, also share an anonymized prefix of equal length (see e.g., [8]). This is actually the
best anonymization technique with respect to utility since it preserves the full design space. We will
use it in our measurement study as a reference to a perfect anonymization scheme (with respect to
utility). PP is applied to traces from CAIDA and CRAWDAD.
Note that anonymization always involves a tradeoff between data utility and the risk of privacy
violations [5]. Ideally, an anonymization scheme would guarantee perfect protection from privacy
violations (low risk) without affecting the utility of data with respect to some target application (high
utility). In this paper, however, we focus on data utility only. For attacks on anonymization techniques
please refer to [4, 10, 3, 17].
3. Methodology
In this section, we describe our methodology for studying the impact of anonymization on sta-
tistical anomaly detection. We introduce the data set used in this study, and describe the methodology
for classifying it. We further present the Kalman filter that is used as detection algorithm.
3.1. Measurement Data
The data used in this study was captured from the four border routers of the Swiss Academic and
Research Network (SWITCH, AS 559) [21], a medium-sized backbone operator, connecting several
universities and research labs (e.g., IBM, CERN) to the Internet. The SWITCH IP address range
contains about 2.4 million IP addresses and the traffic volume varies between 60 and 140 million
NetFlow records per hour. We analyzed a three-week period (from August 19th to September 10th
2007). This data set contains a variety of anomalies with diverse characteristics. In total, 43.2 billion
flows covering a volume of 713 Terabytes of traffic were analyzed. In contrast to previous work, this
study is based on un-sampled and non-anonymized flow data. Such datasets are difficult to obtain
(at least over longer observation periods), but mandatory if bias and distortion in the results are to be
avoided.
3.2. Ground Truth
The first step of any measurement study on anomaly detection is the establishment of ground
truth for the available traces. Unfortunately, obtaining ground truth for an unclassified data set is
still a large challenge and involves a lot of manual inspection. In the following, we describe our
methodology for labeling the dataset.
Visual inspection of metric timeseries: We computed the timeseries for five well-known metrics
over an entire three weeks period at 15-minute intervals, resulting in 2016 data points per metric.
As metrics, we selected byte, packet, and flow counts, unique IP address counts, and the Shannon
entropy¶ of flows per IP address. Moreover, we distinguished incoming and outgoing traffic, as well
as TCP and UDP traffic adopting what is common practice in the anomaly detection community.
Finally, we visually inspected all these timeseries for unusual events.
Analysis of raw NetFlow traces: For all intervals that could not be classified by timeseries
inspection with high confidence, we did further analysis on the raw NetFlow traces. For this purpose,
¶H(X) = −
∑
n
i=1
P (xi) · log2
(
P (xi)
)
Vol DoS Sca Flu Unk Tot
TCP 75 32 539 24 19 689
UDP 64 14 4 239 28 339
Table 2: Ground truth: Number of anomalous intervals
per anomaly type and total for UDP/TCP.
we used nfdump [14], a tool developed by SWITCH for forensic analysis to collect more information
about suspicious events, e.g., which hosts and ports are affected.
Assigning ground truth to each interval: If at least one of the analyzed metric timeseries exposed
an unusual event in some interval, we classified that interval as anomalous. Note here that most events
were visible across multiple metric timeseries.
Identifying the anomaly type: Having classified all intervals as normal or anomalous, we went
one step further and assigned the anomalous events to different types. Since a commonly agreed
methodology for classifying known anomalies is not yet established, we define and distinguish the
following types of events:
• Volume: Volume anomalies are events that cause a sharp increase or decrease in the volume-
based metrics, but do not affect the feature-based metrics. In our trace, we found two large loss
events and several high-volume flows or alpha flows.
• (D)DoS: Denial of Service attacks cause a concentration of the flows on one or few target
IP addresses and hence a drop in the destination IP address entropy. If, on top, the attack
is distributed, we will additionally see a spike in the source IP address counts and entropy
metrics. If the attack is large in terms of flows or even packets, in addition, it will cause a spike
in volume-based metrics.
• Scan: Scans provoke an increase in the destination IP address counts and entropy. If the attack
sources are distributed, we will also see an increase in the source IP counts.
• Network Fluctuation: Events that cause an increase or decrease in the IP counts at lower
resolutions but are not significant in the IP address counts at the highest resolution, fall into
this class. Examples of such anomalies are ingress shifts and route flaps, but also massively
distributed coordinated events that involve only a small number of IP addresses (e.g., botnet
activity or stealth scans).
• Unknown: Despite the classification effort that was made, some events remained unclassified.
All unclassified events fall into this class.
Table 2 summarizes the identified events in our three-week long trace for UDP and TCP traffic.
Note that we counted the number of anomalous intervals not the number of anomalies. Therewith the
number of anomalous intervals can be quite large for anomalies that persist over several hours or even
days. For example, a large part of the 542 TCP-scanning intervals belongs to a single long-lasting
event. Likewise, most of the 239 intervals classified as network fluctuation belong to one single event
that reappeared every 2 hours over several days, but lasted each time only for few intervals.
3.3. Anomaly Detection with the Kalman Filter
From the list of available statistical anomaly detection methods, we selected the Kalman filter
since its excellent performance for anomaly detection has been shown in [20]. The Kalman filter is
an efficient recursive filter that estimates the state of a dynamic system from a series of incomplete
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and noisy measurements. It models normal traffic as a “measurement-corrected” AR(1) process plus
zero-mean Gaussian noise. The difference between this model and the actual measured time series,
the so-called residual, is used for detection (see Fig. 3 for an illustration). An alarm is raised by the
detector if the residual excesses some threshold.
We calculated a total of 60 metrics (see next Section) on the three-weeks data set, and applied
the Kalman filter separately to each of those. This results in a {60 x 2016} matrix of residual values,
one for each metric and interval. An anomaly is detected if at least one of the 60 residual values
for an interval exceeds a threshold. We assess the performance of the Kalman filter with the help of
ROC curves [9]. ROC curves plot the rate of false positives against the rate of true positives for a
range of thresholds. As thresholds, we use multiples of the a posteriori estimation for the standard
deviation (s) of the considered metric. The thresholds range from 0.2s (top right corner) to 2.4s
(bottom left corner). Remind from theory that an interval which exceeds the standard deviation of the
noise process is considered unusual. In general, the higher the true positive rate at a particular false
positive rate, the better the performance of the detector. Hence, the curve of an optimal detector goes
through the top left corner whereas a curve close to the diagonal represents random guessing.
For both UDP (left) and TCP (right) traffic, Fig. 5 shows one ROC curve per anomaly class, and
one curve for the overall detection capabilities. We restrict our analysis to a specific type of anomaly
as follows: we exclude all intervals that have been manually classified as anomalous, but of a different
type, and used these shortened timeseries as input for the detector. We see from this Figure that the
Kalman filter generally works well. For UDP, we obtain very high true positive rates at a small false
negative rate for all classes of anomalies. Detection results for TCP traffic are slightly worse. This is
however expected since TCP has a larger traffic share than UDP and is also more volatile compared
to UDP traffic.
When examining the traces in detail, we found that false positives are often due to fast increases
or decreases in the normal daily traffic cycle, which are misinterpreted by the Kalman filter as anoma-
lous events. Another source for false positives are temporary increases in the volatility of a metric.
This type of false positives can be avoided by recalibrating the Kalman filter each time the volatility
changes. We also observed that the Kalman filter tends to miss anomalies that increase or decrease
more slowly, and take multiple intervals to grow to their full strength. For some of those, however,
the Kalman filter detects the end of the anomaly when the traffic suddenly falls or rises to its previous
vbm{00} fbm{16} fbm{24} fbm{32}
PP x x x x
PPP(16) x x x
RP x x
TR(08) x x x
TR(16) x x
TR(32) x
Table 3: Metrics available with different anonymization
techniques (vbm = volume-based metrics, fbm = feature-
based metrics).
level. There is one more thing to point out in Fig. 5: The false positive rate at a specific threshold is
practically the same for all classes of anomalies (i.e., all markers representing the same threshold are
more or less vertically aligned). The reason therefore is that the false positive rate depends only on
the normal traffic, which is the same for all cases, and not on the studied anomaly.
3.4. Computing the Utility of Anonymized Data
Basically, we use the same methodology for the non-anonymized case as for the anonymized
traffic. The difference is, however, that we run the Kalman filter only on the subset of the 60 metrics
that is available for the anonymization technique under study.
The 60 studied metrics are different variants of three volume-based metrics (vbm) (byte, packet,
and flow counts) and two feature-based metrics (fbm) (the unique IP address count, and the Shan-
non entropy of flows per IP address). We distinguished TCP and UDP traffic as well as incoming
and outgoing traffic. Moreover, we used a subset size of 0 for all metrics, i.e., we computed our
metrics over all available traffic. Since we were interested in exploring how the restriction of avail-
able resolutions affects anomaly detection, we computed the metrics at four representative resolution
levels of {00, 16, 24, 32} bits‖. Here, we made a distinction between volume- and feature-based
metrics. We computed volume-based metrics only at the lowest resolution of all traffic. This is
because the computation of volume metrics at higher resolutions (e.g., the volume per IP) results
in one time series per entity, and a clustering mechanism would be required to summarize them
into one metric. The impact of anonymization on clustering algorithms, however, is not subject of
this study. Feature-based metrics, on the other hand, were computed at a resolution of {16, 24,
32} bits. The lowest resolution was not used for feature-based metrics since it results always in a
value of one (e.g., there is only one unique /0 prefix in the trace). Therewith, we obtain a total of
(3[vbm] + (2[fbm]× 2[src/dst]× 3[res]))× 2[in/out]× 2[udp/tcp] = 60 detection metrics.
The resolutions available with each anonymization scheme are given in Table 3. Also refer to
Fig. 2 which illustrates the subset of the design space available with each technique. The volume-
based metrics computed at a resolution of 00 bits (vbm{00}) are available for all anonymization
techniques. Feature-based metrics computed at a resolution of 16 bits are available with all techniques
that retain this resolution, i.e., PP, PPP(16), TR(08), and TR(16). Likewise, feature-based metrics
at a resolution of 24 bits are available with all anonymization techniques that retain the resolution
of 24 bits, i.e., PP, and TR(08). Finally, feature-based metrics computed at a resolution of 32 bits
are available with all permutation-based techniques since these retain the notion of individual IP
addresses.
To assess the utility, we compared the ROC curves obtained when using the restricted set of
metrics available with each anonymization technique. Further, we reduced the complex ROC curves
‖A resolution of 8 bits is too low for our data set.
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Figure 5: ROC curves for different types of anomalies in
UDP (left) and TCP traffic (right).
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Figure 6: Volume anomalies in anonymized traffic, UDP
(left), TCP (right).
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Figure 7: Scanning and denial of service anomalies in
anonymized traffic, UDP (left), TCP (right).
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Figure 8: Network fluctuations in anonymized traffic,
UDP (left), TCP (right).
to a single utility value by computing the area under the curve (AUC) [1]. To obtain the AUC from
the empirical ROC curves, we fitted a piecewise cubic Hermite interpolating polynomial to the data,
and approximated the area under the curve numerically. In the next section, we describe and discuss
the results obtained with the methodology described above.
4. Measurement Results
We commence this section with an illustrative example for the loss of resolution effect, i.e., we
examine how the restriction of available resolutions through anonymization impacts the detectability
of anomalies. In Fig. 4, we plot the count of unique source addresses in all incoming TCP traffic
at different resolutions of IP addresses (32), /24 networks (24), /20 networks (20), and /16 networks
(16). In the curve for the highest resolution value, we see a large peak corresponding to 1.2 mil-
lion additional IP addresses launching a denial of service attack. Interestingly, the peak completely
disappears at a resolution of 24 and lower. Observing the curve for /24 networks more closely, we
find a very small, non-significant peak of ≈ 5’000 additional networks in the same interval. From
this observation, we conclude that the attack sources remain in a few /24 networks. As seen in the
figure, this example anomaly disappears at lower resolutions, and thus, it will be hard or impossible
to detect in data anonymized with truncation. In the following, we systematically assess the overall
utility of the different anonymization techniques with the help of the Kalman filter detector applied to
the whole three-week long data set.
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Figure 9: Utility for large-scale anomaly detection for different anonymization techniques. Left plot is for UDP traffic,
right plot is for TCP traffic.
4.1. ROC Curves for Anonymized Data
To assess the utility of the different anonymization schemes, we study the impact of anonymi-
zation separately for each type of anomaly. This is necessary since each type of anomaly is exposed
at characteristic traffic granularities, and thus, is impacted differently by the restriction of the gran-
ularity design space through anonymization. To give an example: Alpha flows are mainly visible in
byte and packet counts computed at the lowest resolution, while scans are primarily visible in feature-
based metrics at higher resolutions. Hence, studying all anomalies together will thus not lead to any
conclusive results. As a result, we distinguish the following anomalies for our evaluation:
Volume Anomalies, such as outage events and alpha flows, are mainly exposed by volume-based
metrics. Since volume-based metrics at the lowest resolution are available with all anonymization
schemes (see Table 3), we expect that anonymization does not have a large impact on the detection
of volume anomalies. Indeed, the measurement results presented in Fig. 6 clearly confirm this ex-
pectation. Anonymization does not alter the utility of data when one is solely interested in detection
of volume anomalies. When examining the plot for TCP traffic more closely, we observe that black-
marking and random permutation perform slightly better than the other schemes. We conclude that
using fewer metrics might even be beneficial as it results in fewer false positives.
Scanning and denial of service anomalies are both mainly visible in feature-based metrics.
Measurement results for this class of anomalies are presented in Fig. 7. The curves for UDP and
TCP confirm that blackmarking performs worst, whereas prefix-preserving permutation (which does
not restrict the granularity design space at all) has the best performance. To give an example: at a
false positive rate of 0.02, the detection rate for blackmarking is reduced by 50% for UDP, and even
more for TCP traffic. Surprisingly, the ranking for truncation and random permutation is not the same
for UDP and TCP traffic. For TCP traffic, random permutation outperforms truncation, while for
UDP traffic the opposite applies. We think this is due to structural differences between, normal and
anomalous, UDP and TCP traffic. We verified on the data that TCP scans and DoS attacks are mainly
visible at the resolution of individual IP addresses, which are preserved by random permutation but
not truncation. On the contrary, UDP scans and DoS attacks are visible at high and low resolutions,
but metrics at lower resolutions have fewer false positives. Consequently, truncation outperforms
random permutation for detecting UDP scans and DoS attacks.
Network fluctuations are mainly visible in feature-based metrics at lower resolutions. The ROC
curves for UDP and TCP traffic presented in Fig. 8 show that detection of network fluctuations is
almost impossible when either blackmarking or random permutation is used. Truncation of 8 bits, on
the other hand, does not result in a severe performance degradation, neither for TCP nor UDP traffic.
UDP and TCP differentiate with respect to the performance of 16-bit truncation and PPP. This might,
however, be a particularity of our data set: Most of the 239 network fluctuation anomalies in the UDP
traffic are mainly visible at a resolution of 16 bits, whereas TCP network fluctuations are rather visible
at a resolution of 8 bits.
4.2. Utility of Anonymized Traces for Anomaly Detection
We will now summarize the detailed results from Section 4.1 using the area under the curve
(AUC) as a measure for the utility of an anonymized data set. An AUC value of 1 means that the
detector achieves perfect accuracy, whereas a detector with an AUC of 0.5 is not useful. In Fig. 9,
we plot for each anonymization technique (x-axis) the AUC value (y-axis). The left plot summarizes
the results for UDP traffic and the right plot is for TCP traffic. We show one curve for each of the
three anomaly classes (volume, scan/DoS, and network fluctuations), as well as the average over all
classes. Note that this average utility corresponds to a data set that contains the same ratio of volume,
scan/DoS, and network fluctuation anomalies.
Fig. 9 clearly shows that the detectability of volume anomalies is not impacted by anonymiza-
tion. Furthermore, it confirms our intuition that prefix-preserving anonymization has the best utility
with respect to backbone anomaly detection in general, and that blackmarking has the worst utility for
all classes except volume anomalies. The utility of random permutation, truncation, and partial prefix-
preserving permutation largely depends on the type of anomaly in question. Partial prefix-preserving
permutation performs almost as well as prefix-preserving permutation; it has a lower utility only for
network fluctuation anomalies in TCP traffic. Random permutation has a high utility for the detection
of large-scale scans and denial of service attacks, but a low utility for detecting network fluctuations
in UDP as well as TCP traffic. Truncation performs very well for UDP traffic in our measurements,
but has a lower utility for detecting scans, denial of service attacks, and network fluctuation anomalies
in TCP traffic. Moreover, the utility for these anomalies decreases when more bits are truncated.
Naturally, the overall utility of an anonymization technique applied to a given data set depends
on the mix of anomalies within the trace. For our data set, the overall utility for detecting TCP
anomalies is clearly dominated by the 542 scanning intervals. Likewise, the overall utility for UDP
traffic is to a large extent dominated by the 239 intervals with network fluctuations. Hence, for
this anomaly mix, PP and PPP offer the highest utility, truncation lies in the middle, and random
permutation and blackmarking result in the lowest utility. We summarize the results for our data set
as follows:
• Blackmarking decreases the utility for detecting anomalies in UDP and TCP traffic dramati-
cally.
• Random permutation performs very bad with the detection of anomalies in UDP traffic, while
preserving the utility for TCP traffic.
• Truncation of 8 or 16 bit decreases the utility for detecting anomalies in TCP traffic by roughly
• (Partial) prefix-preserving permutation has no significant negative impact on the utility for de-
tecting anomalies in UDP and TCP traffic.
To derive more general conclusions about the utility of different anonymization schemes it
would be helpful to study the anomaly mix in available flow traces. If this mix converges, at least
for traces recorded in the same time period, a general conclusion about the utility can be derived
directly from our results. Moreover, we expect that the results for volume, scan/DoS, and network
fluctuation anomalies hold also for other traces. Verifying this assumption requires that we apply our
methodology to further un-anonymized data sets from different networks. Unfortunately, such traces
are not currently available in abundance.
5. Implicit Traffic Aggregation
In Section 4, we investigated how anomaly detection results are falsified when valuable resolu-
tions are not available for anomaly detection. Another aspect of anonymization that is worth studying
is the restriction along the subset size dimension, causing an implicit aggregation of traffic.
Let us illustrate this with an example. Consider the case where traffic from a single host (i.e.,
subset size 32) is to be investigated in presence of 4 bits truncation. The best one can do under these
circumstances is investigation of the /28 network that contains the host, since the individual host can
no longer be distinguished from other hosts in the same network. As a consequence, the analyzed
traffic is a mixture of traffic from the target host and traffic from other hosts in neighboring subnets.
In accordance with loss of resolution, we refer to this effect as the loss of focus effect.
The impact of the loss of focus effect is, of course, highly dependent on the distribution of traffic
in the studied network. It is extremely difficult to predict the implications for a particular case. In
the worst case, even truncation of a single bit can be fatal. That is, traffic characteristics of the target
host could get lost completely in another host’s traffic. In the best case, where the truncated subnet
is dedicated to a single host, no traffic is aggregated. In that case, the loss of focus effect is simply
reduced to a loss of resolution effect.
We can, however, estimate the average severity of truncation-induced traffic aggregation by
analyzing the count of additional, non-belonging, flows for 170 individual hosts. In particular, we
count the flows of 170 webservers belonging to a single /16 network in our un-anonymized traces.
Then, we apply truncation to the traces and count the number of flows to the subnets containing the
webservers.
When truncating a single bit, more than 50% of the observed webservers experience no addi-
tional traffic. Only around 10% of the webservers have a resulting traffic increase of 100% or more.
However, if more bits are truncated the situation gets worse. The ratio of unaffected servers drops to
20% for 2 bits, 5% for 4 bits, and even 0% for 8 bits. Similarly, the ratio of servers that experience at
least a doubling of traffic goes up to 25% for 2 bits, 55% for 4 bits and 89% for 8 bits.
We conclude that accurate detection of small-scale anomalies∗∗ is very difficult, if not impos-
sible, when the desired subset size is not supported by the restricted granularity design space. The
probability that host characteristics are lost in aggregated traffic is simply too high. Only anomalies
of sufficient scale have a chance to be visible in aggregated traffic at larger subset sizes. In addition,
false positives are introduced by the aggregation with traffic from other hosts.
∗∗With small-scale anomalies we denote anomalies affecting only a single host or a small subnet.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have answered the question of how anonymization techniques impact statistical
anomaly detection. We introduced the detection granularity design space as an important tool to
illustrate this impact. We have shown how the design space, spanned by subset size and resolution,
is reduced by the most common IP address anonymization techniques. Finally, we analyzed the
utility of anonymized traces for the detection of large-scale anomalies, as well as the impact on traffic
characteristics of individual hosts with the aid of backbone traffic traces gathered over a three-weeks
period.
In general, our results indicate that the restriction of the granularity design space through ano-
nymization hinders anomaly detection. With respect to the individual techniques, we have found that
prefix-preserving permutation offers the best utility, and blackmarking performs the worst. Moreover,
we have shown that the performance of random permutation, partial-prefix preserving permutation,
and truncation strongly depends on the type of anomaly that is studied, as well as the underlying
transport protocol. Our results indicate that the detection of volume anomalies, such as outages or
alpha flows, is not impacted by anonymization at all. The utility for detecting scans and denial of
service attacks degrades when truncation is applied. Detection of network fluctuations, on the other
hand, is impacted principally by blackmarking and random permutation.
Thus, if one is interested in a particular type of anomaly, anonymization could be tuned in a way
such that the results are less impaired. In addition, we have shown that the anonymization-induced
loss of focus, i.e., when the desired subset size is not available, in most cases completely distorts the
traffic characteristics of individual hosts.
While we provided some interesting insights on the impact of anonymization techniques on
anomaly detection, we encourage further research with un-anonymized traffic traces to challenge or
confirm our results.
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